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Abstract
Recent research has shown that risk and reward are positively correlated in many environments, and that people have
internalized this association as a “risk-reward heuristic”: when making choices based on incomplete information, people infer
probabilities from payoffs and vice-versa, and these inferences shape their decisions. We extend this work by examining
people’s expectations about another fundamental trade-off — that between monetary reward and delay. In 2 experiments (total
N = 670), we adapted a paradigm previously used to demonstrate the risk-reward heuristic. We presented participants with
intertemporal choice tasks in which either the delayed reward or the length of the delay was obscured. Participants inferred
larger rewards for longer stated delays, and longer delays for larger stated rewards; these inferences also predicted people’s
willingness to take the delayed option. In exploratory analyses, we found that older participants inferred longer delays and
smaller rewards than did younger ones. All of these results replicated in 2 large-scale pre-registered studies with participants
from a different population (total N = 2138). Our results suggest that people expect intertemporal choice tasks to offer a
trade-off between delay and reward, and differ in their expectations about this trade-off. This “delay-reward heuristic” offers
a new perspective on existing models of intertemporal choice and provides new insights into unexplained and systematic
individual differences in the willingness to delay gratification.
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1 Introduction
Would you rather receive $10 now or $15 in 3 months’ time?
Thousands of studies have used this kind of question to in-
vestigate the processes by which humans choose between
outcomes that differ in when they will occur. The central
finding is that, for positive outcomes, deferment renders a
positive outcome less attractive – that is, delays lead to dis-
counting of the reward. To avoid dynamic inconsistency
(changes in preference between the sooner and later options
as they both draw nearer to the present moment), discounting
should follow an exponential function: 퐹 = 퐴푒−푘푡 , where
퐹 is the subjective value now of an amount 퐴 that occurs at
time 푡 from now, and 푘 is a parameter that determines the
steepness of the discounting (Samuelson, 1937). However,
people’s preferences typically deviate from this prescription
by showing steeper discounting over short delays than over
long ones (e.g., Green & Myerson, 1996); this pattern is
often labelled “hyperbolic”, but it has been modelled with a
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wide range of functions, each capturing distinct psychologi-
cal insights (see Doyle, 2013, for a review).
The present experiments contribute to our understanding
of intertemporal choice by examining people’s expectations
about the options they will encounter in intertemporal choice
tasks. For example, when asked: “Would you rather receive
$10 now or $15 in. . . ”, what expectation do decision-makers
have about the to-be-revealed delay? And how does that
expectation shape their subsequent evaluation of the options?
These questions are motivated by a long line of research
showing that people internalize and exploit ecological reg-
ularities to make inferences when they have incomplete in-
formation (e.g., Brunswick, 1943; Gigerenzer et al., 1999;
Skylark, 2018), and that recent experience with attribute
values and trade-offs shapes the attractiveness of a given op-
tion (e.g., Stewart et al., 2003; Tversky & Simonson, 1993;
Rigoli & Dolan, 2019). Most pertinent to the current work
is a series of studies by Pleskac and colleagues investigating
people’s expectations about the trade-off between risk and
reward.
In an initial series of studies, Pleskac and Hertwig (2014)
found that, across a wide range of real-world domains, larger
rewards are associated with smaller probabilities, such that
gambles gravitate towards being “fair bets”.1 Pleskac and
1There are various reasons for this; perhaps the simplest is the operation
of competition. For example, a lottery that offers unattractive odds will lose
punters to one that offers a better chance of winning, but a lottery that offers
an expected return greater than the price of the ticket will go bust.
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Hertwig suggest that people have internalized this regular-
ity and use it when confronted with incomplete information
about a risky option – i.e., that people employ a “risk-reward
heuristic”.2 They contrast this hypothesis with traditional
economic theory, in which probability, money, and time are
all independent factors (e.g., Savage, 1954), andwith the pre-
dictions of a “desirability bias”wherein people optimistically
rate desirable outcomes as more probable then undesirable
ones (e.g., Krizan & Windschitl 2007).
Pleskac and Hertwig (2014) tested their hypothesis by
presenting a lottery that costs $2 to play and which of-
fers the opportunity to win $2.50, $4, $10, $50, or $100
(with the value varied between participants). As predicted,
participants’ estimates of the probability of winning were
negatively associated with the value of the prizes. Having
made their estimates, participants were asked whether they
would play the lottery: willingness to play was positively
associated with both the stated prize and the inferred proba-
bility. Skylark and Prabhu-Naik (2018) subsequently found
that people likewise infer missing reward values from stated
probabilities; again, the stated and inferred values both pre-
dicted subsequent choice. More recent work by Leuker et
al. (2018; 2019a,b) has directly manipulated the risk-reward
trade-off in a learning environment and found that this affects
subsequent inferences about, and choices between, risky op-
tions for which probability information is not provided.
We ask whether similar principles operate in the domain
of intertemporal choice. A positive correlation between time
and reward is found in many contexts. One simple justifica-
tion is given by Stewart et al. (2006) and also follows from
Pleskac and Hertwig’s (2014) studies of the ecological risk-
reward relationship: large gains are much rarer than small
ones, so the time between large gains must on average be
longer. However, it is not clear that people will have in-
ternalized this association – and if they have, it is not clear
that it will take the form of a single, simple delay-reward
function, because in everyday life people will experience a
variety of such functions. For example, in games of chance
like roulette the expected waiting time for a given outcome
is a linear function of the payoff for that outcome, whereas
bank accounts often offer returns that grown exponentially
via compound interest – although the interest rate may be
higher for longer term investments (to compensate for in-
creased risk) or may vary unpredictably.3 And investments
based on stock prices, or other instruments, can show even
more complex relationships between time and returns. Thus,
we predict that a decision-maker who brings their past ex-
perience to bear in a psychological study of inter-temporal
2A strong form of this heuristic entails the inference that gambles have
expected returns equal to the stake; a more general version entails that
people infer larger rewards to have lower probability, and vice-versa.
3As one illustration, a one-year investment earning the Bank of Eng-
land’s base rate that started in February 2008 would have been earning
5.25% interest p.a. in the first month but only 1.5% p.a. for the last month.
choice will expect a positive association between delay and
reward, but given the variety of forms that they are likely to
have encountered we remain agnostic about the precise form
of this expectation.
The existence of such a “delay-reward heuristic” would
be important for several reasons. First, it would support
the general claim that humans internalize and exploit eco-
logical structure when making decisions from incomplete
information. Second, the beliefs that people hold about the
probable delay-reward trade-offmay cast new light on efforts
to identify the best mathematical description of intertempo-
ral choice data (e.g., McKerchar et al., 2009), because such
data would reflect variable past experiences rather than an
immutable discounting function. Third, the existence of a
delay-reward heuristic could provide new insights into in-
dividual differences in delay discounting (e.g., Reimers et
al., 2009): variation in environmental context will produce
heterogeneous preferences, and if particular demographic or
dispositional variables are associated with particular con-
texts then this could partly or wholly explain the relationship
between these individual-difference variables and people’s
intertemporal choice behaviour.
In four experiments, we adopt the approach of Pleskac
and Hertwig (2014) and Skylark and Prabhu-Naik (2018) to
investigate how changes in the stated delay affect inferences
about the value of a monetary reward and vice-versa. We
focus on the kinds of choice between immediate and delayed
monetary outcomes with which we began this paper, and
frame the task as being “a psychology experiment” because
we believe that this is the most common context in which
people encounter this kind of simplified decision.
2 Methods
The four experiments were similar so their Methods are de-
scribed together. The study materials are available from
https://osf.io/e2fnt/
2.1 Participants
Studies 1A and 1B recruited US-based participants via
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (www.mturk.com); Studies 2A
and 2B recruited UK-based participants via Prolific (www.
prolific.co). In all studies, eligible participants were those
who provided complete data, who were aged 18+, who did
not self-report past participation, and whose IP address had
not previously occurred in the data file of the current study
or earlier in the study series (including in related studies not
reported here). Full details of the screening/eligibility re-
quirements are given in Appendix 1. The final samples are
described in Table 1.
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Table 1: Demographic data.
Study 1A Study 1B Study 2A Study 2B
N 333 337 1074 1064
Age range; M (SD) 20–74; 35.9 (11.5) 19–72 (10.2) 18–87; 35.9 (13.7) 18–82; 35.5 (13.0)
Gender: M, F, prefer not to say 193, 140, 0 200, 137, 0 334, 734, 6 331, 730, 3
Attentive — — 844 (78.6%) 833 (78.3%)
Novice — — 814 (75.8%) 781 (73.4%)
Attentive & Novice — — 638 (59.4%) 613 (57.6%)
Note: The “Attentive” row indicates the size and proportion of the sample that passed both attention-check questions;
“Novice” indicates the size and proportion of sample who indicated that they had not previously taken part in a psychology
study involving intertemporal choice between monetary outcomes.
2.2 Design and Procedure
Studies 1A and 1Bwere exploratory; Studies 2A and 2Bwere
pre-registered confirmatory studies (https://aspredicted.org/
mn3vn.pdf). All studies were conducted online. After an
initial landing page, information sheet, and consent form,
participants were told that they would be asked to consider a
simple financial decision. They were told that although the
scenario was hypothetical, they should answer as honestly
and accurately as they could and that there were no right or
wrong answers.
2.2.1 Study 1A
In Study 1A, participants were randomly assigned to 1 of
6 conditions, which differed in the time until the delayed
reward. In the “1 day” condition, participants were told:
Suppose that you take part in a Psychology ex-
periment in which the experimenter offers you a
choice between two financial options. Due to a
random printing error, part of one of the options
is missing, so you can’t see the value that is meant
to be displayed. The choice that the experimenter
presents youwith is shown below, with themissing
value replaced by an “X”.
Which would you choose?
Option A: Receive $10 now
Option B: Receive $X in 1 day’s time
What do you think the missing value, X, is? Enter
a number in the box below.
There followed a text box in which participants entered
their judgment (only numeric responses were permitted).
Note that they did not make a choice at this point. On the
page after the estimation question, participants were told:
Suppose that your estimate of the missing value is
correct. That is, suppose that the experimenter is
offering you a choice between:
Option A: receive $10 now
Option B: receive [participant’s estimate] in 1
day’s time
Which would you choose?
Participants indicated their choice by selecting between 2
radio buttons labelled “Option A” and “Option B”. The 1
week, 2 weeks, 1 month, 6 months, and 1 year conditions
were identical to the 1 day condition, except that the cor-
responding time period was used when stating the delayed
option; each participant completed a single condition (i.e.,
made one estimate followed by one choice).
Finally, participants were asked whether they had previ-
ously started or completed the survey, and for their age and
gender (male, female, or prefer not to say). After answering
these questions, participants proceeded to a debriefing sheet.
All questions required a response before the participant could
progress to the next page.
2.2.2 Study 1B
Study 1B was identical to Study 1A, but the estimation task
specified the delayed amount as either $13, $18, $23, $28,
$33, or $38, and the missing value “X” referred to the delay
associated with that outcome (e.g., the choice was: “Option
A: Receive $10 now. Option B: Receive $13 in X”). Par-
ticipants indicated their estimate of X (which they were told
could include a decimal point) via a text box and selected one
of 4 radio buttons to indicate the temporal units (“Day(s)”,
“Week(s)”, “Month(s)”, or “Year(s)”). As in Study 1A, they
then proceeded to a screen that asked them to suppose that
their estimate was correct and asked them to choose between
the smaller-sooner and larger-later rewards, with their esti-
mate of the delay used for the delayed option.
2.2.3 Studies 2A and 2B
Studies 2A and 2B were identical to Studies 1A and 1B,
respectively, except as follows. All monetary values were
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in Sterling (£) and delays were expressed in days: in Study
2A, participants were randomly assigned to one of 8 de-
lays: 1, 4, 12, 27, 63, 88, 122, or 243 days, and estimated
the reward; in Study 2B, participants were assigned to one
of 8 future rewards: £11, 13, 15, 18, 23, 29, 38, or 54,
and estimated the delay in days. Both studies included 2
multiple-choice attention-check questions after participants
had made their choice; one question asked the value of the
immediate reward (correct answer: £10); the other question
asked why one value was originally replaced by an “X” (cor-
rect answer: because of a printing error). Participants who
answered both questions correctly were labelled “Attentive”.
Finally, we added a question that probed the participant’s
past encounters with intertemporal choices studies [“Have
you ever previously taken part in a Psychology study in
which you were asked to choose between two amounts of
money that differ in when they would be given to you (i.e.,
like this study)?”; response options: Yes/No/Don’t know].
Participants who answered “No” were labelled “Novices”.
Studies 2A and 2B were run in parallel; participants were
randomly assigned to one or the other.
2.3 Data treatment
We pre-registered that we would exclude any negative esti-
mates, but there weren’t any. All time values were converted
to “days” (assuming 365 days per year and 365/12 days per
month; in Study 1A, the delay for the “6 month” condition
was treated as 365/2 days). For regression analyses, stated
delay and stated reward were each divided by 10 (so the coef-
ficients represent the effect of a 10-day or 10-dollar change),
and age was divided by 10 and mean-centred (so the co-
efficients represent the effect of being 10 years older than
average). Gender was coded -0.5, 0.5, and 0 for females,
males, and “prefer not to say”, respectively.
3 Results
For Studies 1A and 1B,we beganwith simple tests ofwhether
estimated rewards and delays depend on stated delays and
rewards, and of whether estimates and stated values both
influence choices. We then conducted more comprehensive
exploratory analyses and robustness checks, which we sub-
sequently pre-registered as the analysis plan for Studies 2A
and 2B.
For Studies 1A and 1B, 푝-values less than .05 were treated
as potentially important and we computed 95% confidence
intervals; for the pre-registered Studies 2A and 2B, alpha
was set to .01 and we report 99% confidence intervals.
A small proportion of participants inferred future rewards
that were smaller than the immediately-available amount.
Because participants were told there were no right or wrong
answers, and because somemay have believed they would be
asked about a negative trade-off, we report the results with
all estimates included in the analyses.
3.1 Studies 1A and 1B
In all studies, estimates (inferred rewards and delays) were
highly positively skewed but approximately normal after
transformation by 푙표푔10 (푥 + 1). The normality was only
approximate: participants typically selected from a small
set of possible values [for example, 6 months (182.5 days)
when estimating the delay in Study 1B]. Figure 1 shows, in
ascending order, the unique responses in each study; the y-
axis shows the proportion of participants in each study who
made that response, with data from each condition indicated
by different shades of grey. This strong tendency to round
numeric values is common in estimation tasks (e.g., Laming,
1997; Matthews & Stewart, 2009; Matthews et al., 2016);
we discuss its implications below.
3.1.1 Basic analyses
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for each study. Figure
2 plots estimates against conditions, with solid points in-
dicating the means. (For this plot, we log-transformed the
estimates after adding 1 to deal with zeroes. To improve clar-
ity, we transformed the y-axis tickmarks as 10푣푎푙푢푒; thus, the
y-axes are labelled "Estimate + 1".) The right-hand panels
show the same data with a logarithmic x-axis, which helps to
clarify the effects for low values of the stated delay/reward.
The presence of some extreme responses compresses the
bulk of the data, so Figure 3 re-plots the means with confi-
dence intervals, making the pattern clearer. The impression
from the figures is that inferred delays increased with stated
rewards, and vice-versa. Kruskall-Wallis tests confirmed
that the stated value of the delay affected estimates of the
reward in Study 1A, 휒2 (5) = 75.08, 푝 < .001, and that
stated rewards affected estimates of the associated delay in
Study 1B 휒2 (5) = 28.67, 푝 < .001. One-way ANOVAs on
the log-transformed estimates led to the same conclusions
[Study 1A: 퐹 (5, 327) = 15.56, 푝 < .001, 휂2 = .192; Study
1B: 퐹 (5, 331) = 5.21, 푝 < .001, 휂2 = .073].
Figure 4 shows the proportion of participants choosing to
take the delayed option in each condition. If participants’
inferred delays or rewards corresponded to their indifference
points (i.e., if they thought they were going to be offered
options for which the immediate and delayed options were
equally attractive), the data points would fall on a flat line
at 0.5. Clearly, this is not the case: in all studies, there
is an overall tendency to choose the delayed option. And
at the group level, the data in Figure 4 suggest that larger
stated delays led to less willingness to wait, implying that
the increase in inferred reward was not sufficient to offset
the increase in waiting time. Similarly, increases in stated
reward led to increased willingness to wait, implying that
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Figure 1: Unique responses in each experiment. In all studies, participants tend to use just a handful of response values
when inferring rewards or delays, although this is against a background of more idiosyncratic estimates. The numbers below
the x-axis label the most popular values, along with the smallest and largest estimate in each study. Note that the x-axis is
ordinal: the values are simply arranged from smallest to largest.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics for inferred rewards and inferred delays.
Study 1A
Delay N M SD 95% CI Med LQ,UQ GeoM 95 % CI
1 day 56 13.3 3.6 12.4, 14.3 12 11, 15 12.9 12.0, 13.8
1 week 53 16.6 14.7 12.6, 20.7 15 12, 18 13.8 11.8, 16.2
2 weeks 57 19.3 9.6 16.8, 21.8 15 15, 20 17.8 16.0, 19.6
1 month 54 24.3 25.2 17.4, 31.2 15 15, 20 18.3 15.1, 22.0
6 months 55 31.4 25.8 24.4, 38.3 20 15, 50 22.7 17.8, 28.9
1 year 58 219.5 1307.3 −124.3, 563.2 25 20, 100 36.8 27.2, 49.9
Study 1B
Reward N M SD 95% CI Med LQ,UQ GeoM 95 % CI
$13 55 19.5 24.1 13.0, 26.0 7 7, 30.2 10.5 7.7, 14.4
$18 58 207.6 980.3 −50.2, 465.3 14 7, 30.4 22.0 14.1, 34.3
$23 58 184.9 545.6 41.4, 328.3 20.5 7.3, 83.6 27.1 16.5, 44.2
$28 56 80.1 112.5 50, 110.3 30.4 14, 91.3 37.7 27.0, 52.5
$33 54 58.8 93.6 33.2, 84.3 30 14, 56.1 25.8 18.0, 37.0
$38 56 175.9 730.8 −19.8, 371.6 30.4 14, 91.3 36.4 23.7, 55.9
Study 2A
Delay N M SD 99% CI Med LQ,UQ GeoM 99 % CI
1 day 138 101.6 853.1 −88.1, 291.3 15 12, 20 18.8 15.3, 23.1
4 days 134 23.7 19.8 19.2, 28.2 20 15, 20 19.1 16.4, 22.1
12 days 132 25.7 27.2 19.5, 31.9 15 12, 20 18.3 15.3, 21.9
27 days 137 52.3 101.1 29.7, 74.8 20 15, 50 28.6 22.9, 35.7
63 days 136 78.0 163.4 41.4, 114.6 22.5 20, 50 32.8 25.3, 42.4
88 days 133 129.8 261.5 70.6, 189.1 25 20, 100 40.3 29.1, 55.6
122 days 133 122.9 280.4 59.4, 186.5 30 20, 100 40.0 29.2, 54.8
243 days 131 585.7 4384.6 −415.8, 1587.1 50 20, 100 48.6 32.9, 71.6
Study 2B
Reward N M SD 99% CI Med LQ,UQ GeoM 99 % CI
£11 133 15.4 86.7 −4.3, 35.0 7 3, 10 5.3 4.1, 6.7
£13 134 15.7 42.7 6.1, 25.4 7 3, 10 6.8 5.3, 8.7
£15 133 17.0 40.5 7.8, 26.2 7 7, 20 9.4 7.7, 11.6
£18 132 28.3 69.0 12.6, 44.0 10 7, 28 11.7 8.9, 15.2
£23 134 89.9 652.2 −57.3, 237.2 14 7, 30 14.8 11.1, 19.7
£29 131 30.7 55.0 18.1, 43.2 28 7, 30 16.6 12.8, 21.3
£38 134 118.0 864.7 −77.2, 313.2 28 7, 30 19.4 14.4, 26.0
£54 133 164.1 1042.1 −72.1, 400.2 10 6, 30 17.4 12.6, 24.0
Note: Med = Median; LQ = lower quartile; UQ = upper quartile; GeoM = geometric mean,
calculated as [10푙표푔10 (푥+1) ] − 1.
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Figure 2: Estimated rewards as a function of stated delays, and estimated delays as a function of rewards. The plot shows
푙표푔10 (푒푠푡푖푚푎푡푒 + 1) against condition, with the y-axis tick marks exponentiated to improve clarity. Values have been jittered
to reduce over-plotting. The right-hand panels show the same data with a logarithmic x-axis.
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Figure 3: Figure 2 re-plotted without the raw data points. Error bars show confidence intervals (95% for Studies 1A and 1B,
99% for Studies 2A and 2B).
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the increase in inferred delay was not sufficient to offset the
increasing appeal of the potential gain.
These effects are further evidenced by Table 3, which
shows the results of logistic regression of choice (immedi-
ate reward = 0; delayed reward = 1) on condition (stated
delays and rewards, treated as continuous variables) and log-
transformed estimates (inferred rewards and delays). In both
studies, there was a positive association between willingness
to wait and the stated or inferred reward, and a negative as-
sociation between willingness to wait and stated or inferred
delay. The effects of estimate remain after controlling for
condition: for a given stated delay, people who inferred a
larger future reward were more likely to choose to wait; and
for a given stated reward, those who inferred a larger delay
were less inclined to wait.
3.1.2 The effects of age and gender on inferences
We next conducted exploratory analyses to investigate
whether age and gender predict inferences and choices. First,
we computed theKendall’s correlationmatrices shown in Ta-
ble 4. In Study 1A, estimated rewards were smaller for men
than for women and in Study 1B estimated delays were larger
for older participants. These associations are complicated by
the fact that, in both studies, age and gender are confounded.
To clarify the picture, we regressed log-transformed esti-
mates on age, gender, and condition. We ran several versions
of the analysis to help ensure that our results were not a con-
sequence of particular analytic decisions. In one version,
we treated condition as a continuous predictor, as above.
However, because the relationship may not be linear, we ran
a separate version with condition as a categorical predictor
with successive-difference contrast coding, such that the co-
efficients test the difference between each adjacent pair of
stated delays or rewards; in the case of categorical coding,
we tested the overall effect of condition by using an 퐹-test
to compare the model that included condition with one that
did not. We ran both the continuous-condition and the cat-
egorical condition analyses twice: once with ordinary least
squares (OLS) regression and once with robust regression
using the lmrob function from the robustbase package for R
(Maechler et al., 2020). We report the OLS analysis with
condition as a factor in the main text, and note any dis-
crepancies between these results and the alternative analyses
– whose results are reported in full in the Supplementary
Materials (https://osf.io/e2fnt/).
Table 5 shows the results for Studies 1Aand 1B.Consistent
with the earlier analyses, estimated rewards are positively as-
sociated with stated delays (Study 1A), and estimated delays
are positively associated with stated rewards (Study 1B). In
addition, estimated rewards are negatively associated with
age in Study 1A and estimated delays are positively associ-
ated with age in Study 1B. The analysis also suggests that,
in Study 1B, males inferred longer delays than did females.
Table 3: Logistic regression of choice on stated value and
inferred value.
Study 1A
b SE 95% CI 푧 푝
Intercept 0.981 0.152 0.684, 1.279 6.463 <.001
Stated Delay −0.034 0.008−0.050, −0.017 4.012 <.001
Overall model: 휒2 (1) = 16.37, 푝 < .001, Pseudo-푅2 = .066
Intercept −1.338 0.569−2.453, −0.224 2.354 .019
Est Reward 1.520 0.441 0.655, 2.385 3.444 .001
Overall model: 휒2 (1) = 14.24, 푝 < .001, 푅2 = .058
Intercept −2.644 0.683−3.983, −1.306 3.873 <.001
Stated Delay −0.067 0.011−0.089, −0.045 5.373 <.001
Est Reward 3.075 0.572 1.953, 4.196 5.890 <.001
Overall model: 휒2 (2) = 56.13, 푝 < .001, Pseudo-푅2 = .213
Study 1B
b SE 95% CI 푧 푝
Intercept −0.407 0.376 −1.144, 0.330 1.082 .279
Stated Reward 0.540 0.149 0.247, 0.832 3.612 <.001
Overall model: 휒2 (1) = 13.72, 푝 < .001, Pseudo-푅2 = .057
Intercept 1.509 0.308 0.906, 2.111 4.906 <.001
Est Delay −0.402 0.189−0.772, −0.031 2.126 .034
Overall model: 휒2 (1) = 4.52, 푝 = .033, Pseudo-푅2 = .019
Intercept 0.190 0.427 −0.647, 1.028 0.445 .656
Stated Reward 0.664 0.159 0.352, 0.977 4.168 <.001
Est Delay −0.617 0.202−1.013, −0.220 3.046 .002
Overall model: 휒2 (2) = 23.28, 푝 < .001, Pseudo-푅2 = .096
Note: The table shows the results of 3 different models for each
study: one with stated value as the sole predictor; one with inferred
(estimated) value as the sole predictor; and one with both predictors
entered simultaneously. SE = standard error of coefficient. Est =
Estimated. Pseudo-푅2 values are Nagelkerke’s 푅2. Inferred values
(estimates) were log-transformed as 푙표푔10 (푥 + 1).
The pattern of results was identical for all other versions of
the analyses, except that the tendency for male participants
to infer lower rewards than female participants in Study 1A
had a 95% CI that excluded zero in the robust regression
analysis with condition treated as a continuous variable (b =
−0.054 [−0.105, −0.003], p = .039).
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Figure 4: Choice of delayed option as a function of stated delay and stated reward. Error bars areWilson confidence intervals
(95% for Studies 1A and 1B; 99% for Studies 2A and 2B). The dotted line indicates indifference.
3.1.3 The effects of age and gender on choice
Finally, we took a similar approach to exploring the effects
of demographic variables on decision-making by regressing
choice on condition, estimate, age, and gender. Again, we
conducted several versions of the analysis, to check robust-
ness: for each study we ran 8 versions formed by factorially
varying (a) whether condition was coded as a continuous or
categorical predictor, (b) whether estimates were entered as
raw responses or log-transformed values, and (c) whether
conventional or robust logistic regression was used, with the
latter implemented via the glmrob function in the robustbase
package for R using the recommended “KS2014” setting.
Table 5 shows the results of the standard regression with
condition as a categorical variable and using log-transformed
estimates. As expected from the previous analysis, willing-
ness towait was positively associatedwith stated and inferred
reward, and negatively associatedwith stated and inferred de-
lay. Neither age nor gender was appreciably associated with
choice behaviour. All of the other versions of the regression
analyses yielded the same conclusions
3.2 Studies 2A and 2B
For Studies 2A and 2B, we pre-registered an analysis plan
that comprised all of the analyses from Studies 1A and 1B
that incorporated age and gender. We also pre-registered
that we would apply all analyses to 3 different versions of the
datasets: the full sample; only those participants who passed
both attention-checks; and only those attentive participants
who also indicated that they had never previously taken part
in a monetary intertemporal choice experiment (“attentive
novices”). We report the results for the full sample using
the same regression output as for Studies 1A and 1B, and
Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 15, No. 5, September 2020 Delay-reward heuristic 621
Table 4: Kendall correlations
Study 1A
Est Reward Stated Delay Gender
Stated Delay .378 (.001)
Gender −.116 (.016) −0.079 (.104)
Age −.065 (.100) .003 (.939) −.138 (.003)
Study 1B
Est Delay Stated Reward Gender
Stated Reward .195 (<.001)
Gender .074 (.109) .025 (.607)
Age .205 (<.001) −.039 (.334) −.123 (.007)
Study 2A
Est Reward Stated Delay Gender
Stated Delay .256 (<.001)
Gender .014 (.602) .028 (.293)
Age −.117 (<.001) .003 (.905) −.032 (.208)
Study 2B
Est Delay Stated Reward Gender
Stated Reward .254 (<.001)
Gender −.005 (.853) .026 (.334)
Age .165 (<.001) −.010 (.633) −.027 (.293)
Note: Est = Estimated. Values in parentheses are 푝-values for the
associated correlation.
again note any differences between these and other versions
of the analyses (which are reported in full in the Supplemen-
tary Materials). In the pre-registration, we predicted that
the effects of condition on estimates and of condition and
estimates on choice would match those found in Studies 1A
and 1B, and that older participants would infer longer delays
and smaller rewards than younger participants.
As before, descriptive statistics are shown in Table 2; Fig-
ure 1 illustrates the tendency of participants to use a small
set of round response values; Figures 2 and 3 show the esti-
mates for each condition; and Figure 4 plots the proportion
of participants who chose to wait in each condition. The
Kendall correlations are again shown in Table 4; the regres-
sion results are shown in Table 6.
The results of both studies are very similar to Studies 1A
and 1B, and match the predictions. In Study 2A, participants
inferred larger rewards for longer stated delays, and younger
participants inferred larger rewards than did older ones, with
no meaningful effect of gender. Willingness to choose the
delayed option was greater for shorter stated delays and for
larger inferred rewards, with no appreciable effect of age or
gender. The results were the same for all samples and all
regression specifications. In Study 2B, participants inferred
larger delays from larger stated rewards, and older partici-
pants inferred longer delays than did younger ones. These
results were the same for all samples and specifications. In
the choice data, the willingness to wait was positively as-
sociated with stated reward and negatively associated with
inferred delay, with no effect of age or gender. The only dis-
crepancies across the 24 versions of the analysis were that in
6 cases the 99% CIs for the effect of inferred delay included
zero; in all of these cases the coefficients for the estimated
delay were again negative, and the CIs only just graze zero.4
Taken together, the results of Studies 2A and 2B replicate
the patterns found in Studies 1A and 1B.
4 Discussion
We found that: (a) participants typically inferred larger mon-
etary rewards from longer stated delays, and vice-versa; (b)
estimates of delay and reward were positively skewed and
usually took a relatively small number of distinct values;
(c) willingness to wait was positively correlated with stated
and estimated rewards, and negatively associated with stated
and estimated delays; and (d) that older participants inferred
longer delays and smaller future rewards than did younger
participants, but did not differ in their willingness to wait
for the inferred delayed option. We discuss these results and
outline future research directions.
4.1 Where do the inferences come from?
Our results are consistent with the idea that people approach
decisions with prior expectations about the likely trade-off
between attributes, and that these expectations shape sub-
sequent decisions (Pleskac & Hertwig, 2014; Tversky &
Simonson, 1993). It is important to consider the possible
origins of participants’ numerical estimates in more detail.
One basic distinction is between an associative strategy and
a matching strategy. Under the former, our participants en-
coded past pairings of attribute values and used the provided
value of one attribute (e.g., time) to retrieve associated values
of the other (e.g., monetary reward). In contrast, magnitude-
matching involves producing an estimate for the missing at-
tribute that is subjectively-equal to the stated attribute (e.g.,
responding with a monetary value that “feels the same” as
4Using the nomenclature Sample.Condition.Estimates.Regression to in-
dicate the sample (full, attentive, or attentive-novice), coding of condi-
tion (continuous or factor), coding of estimates (raw or log-transformed),
and type of regression (conventional vs robust), the 6 cases were:
Full.Factor.Raw.Robust: b = −0.026 [−0.054, 0.002], 푝 = .015; At-
tentive.Factor.Raw.Robust: b = −0.026 [−0.058, 0.007], 푝 = .042;
Novice.Factor.Raw.Robust: b = −0.003 [−0.008, 0001], 푝 = .053;
Novice.Factor.Raw.Conventional: b = −0.003 [−0007, 0001], 푝 = .054;
Novice.Continuous.Raw.Conventional: b = −0.004 [−0.008, 0.001], 푝 =
.024.
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Table 5: Regression results for Studies 1A and 1B.
Study 1A
Estimates Choices
b 95% CI 푡 푝 b 95% CI 푧 푝
Intercept 1.312 1.279, 1.345 78.422 <.001 −3.601 −5.127, −2.074 4.623 <.001
1w vs 1d 0.027 −0.087, 0.141 0.464 .643 −1.462 −2.459, −0.464 2.872 .004
2w vs 1w 0.089 −0.024, 0.202 1.547 .123 0.255 −0.603, 1.113 0.582 .561
1m vs 2w 0.013 −0.099, 0.125 0.228 .820 −0.609 −1.457, 0.239 1.407 .159
6m vs 1m 0.097 −0.016, 0.21 1.676 .095 −0.936 −1.786, −0.086 2.158 .031
1y vs 6m 0.205 0.094, 0.316 3.611 <.001 −0.687 −1.554, 0.180 1.553 .121
Estimate 3.319 2.146, 4.493 5.543 <.001
Age −0.035 −0.064, −0.006 2.394 .017 0.115 −0.112, 0.342 0.996 .319
Gender −0.059 −0.126, 0.008 1.726 .085 0.109 −0.415, 0.632 0.407 .684
Effect of condition: 퐹 (5, 325) = 15.43, 푝 < .001 휒2(5) = 57.66, 푝 < .001
Overall model: 퐹 (7, 325) = 12.4, 푝 < .001,
푅2푎푑 푗 = .194
휒2(8) = 72.57, 푝 < .001, Pseudo-푅2 = .270
Study 1B
Estimates Choices
b 95% CI 푡 푝 b 95% CI 푧 푝
Intercept 1.413 1.349, 1.476 43.779 <.001 2.208 1.48, 2.937 5.943 <.001
$18 vs $13 0.251 0.036, 0.467 2.292 .023 1.505 0.673, 2.338 3.544 <.001
$23 vs $18 0.066 −0.146, 0.278 0.613 .540 0.363 −0.534, 1.259 0.793 .428
$28 vs $23 0.149 −0.064, 0.363 1.370 .172 −0.611 −1.479, 0.257 1.380 .168
$33 vs $28 −0.123 −0.341, 0.094 1.110 .268 0.884 −0.038, 1.805 1.879 .060
$38 vs $33 0.176 −0.041, 0.394 1.588 .113 −0.034 −1.029, 0.961 0.067 .946
Estimate −0.844 −1.291, −0.397 3.704 <.001
Age 0.185 0.123, 0.248 5.803 <.001 0.158 −0.111, 0.426 1.151 .250
Gender 0.208 0.079, 0.337 3.170 .002 0.401 −0.135, 0.937 1.467 .142
Effect of condition: 퐹 (5, 329) = 5.54, 푝 < .001 휒2(5) = 33.68, 푝 < .001
Overall model: 퐹 (7, 329) = 9.65, 푝 < .001,
푅2푎푑 푗 = .153
휒2(8) = 40.52, 푝 < .001 Pseudo-푅2 = .162
Note: Inferred values (estimates) were log-transformed as log10 (푥 + 1). 푅2푎푑 푗 is adjusted 푅2. Pseudo-푅2
values are Nagelkerke’s 푅2. For row names in upper table: d = day, w = week(s), m = month(s), y = year.
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Table 6: Regression results for Studies 2A and 2B.
Study 2A
Estimates Choices
b 95% CI 푡 푝 b 95% CI 푧 푝
Intercept 1.490 1.449, 1.530 94.614 <.001 −4.526 −5.794, −3.258 9.192 <.001
4d vs 1d 0.001 −0.148, 0.151 0.020 .984 0.105 −0.817, 1.026 0.293 .770
12d vs 4d −0.002 −0.154, 0.149 0.041 .967 −0.440 −1.347, 0.467 1.250 .211
27d vs 12d 0.182 0.031, 0.332 3.114 .002 −0.300 −1.171, 0.571 0.888 .374
63d vs 27d 0.047 −0.103, 0.197 0.806 .420 −0.466 −1.332, 0.400 1.385 .166
88d vs 63d 0.084 −0.066, 0.235 1.446 .149 −0.954 −1.785, −0.122 2.955 .003
122d vs 88d 0.017 −0.134, 0.168 0.289 .772 −0.129 −0.953, 0.695 0.403 .687
243d vs 122d 0.092 −0.060, 0.243 1.555 .120 −0.094 −0.948, 0.760 0.285 .776
Estimate 4.204 3.242, 5.166 11.260 .001
Age −0.047 −0.074, −0.019 4.376 <.001 −0.023 −0.179, 0.133 0.378 .705
Gender 0.035 −0.046, 0.117 1.116 .264 −0.006 −0.474, 0.461 0.034 .973
Effect of condition: 퐹 (7, 1064) = 16.35, 푝 < .001 휒2(7) = 116.1, 푝 < .001
Overall model: 퐹 (9, 1064) = 15.13,
푝 < .001, 푅2푎푑 푗 = .106
휒2(10) = 310.2, 푝 < .001, Pseudo-푅2 = .374
Study 2B
Estimates Choices
b 95% CI 푡 푝 b 95% CI 푧 푝
Intercept 1.127 1.088, 1.166 74.754 <.001 3.094 2.388, 3.800 11.288 <.001
£13 vs £11 0.073 −0.071, 0.217 1.301 .193 0.741 0.078, 1.404 2.880 .004
£15 vs £13 0.117 −0.027, 0.26 2.091 .037 1.493 0.662, 2.324 4.628 <.001
£18 vs £15 0.075 −0.069, 0.22 1.344 .179 −0.556 −1.437, 0.325 1.625 .104
£23 vs £18 0.114 −0.030, 0.258 2.038 .042 1.197 0.217, 2.176 3.147 .002
£29 vs £23 0.024 −0.12, 0.169 0.436 .663 0.150 −1.018, 1.317 0.330 .741
£38 vs £29 0.094 −0.05, 0.239 1.684 .092 0.703 −0.688, 2.093 1.301 .193
£54 vs £38 −0.047 −0.191, 0.096 0.848 .397 −0.165 −1.661, 1.331 0.284 .777
Estimate −1.001 −1.496, −0.505 5.203 <.001
Age 0.087 0.060, 0.115 8.128 <.001 −0.004 −0.18, 0.172 0.062 .950
Gender 0.045 −0.033, 0.123 1.483 .138 0.354 −0.157, 0.864 1.786 .074
Effect of condition: 퐹 (7, 1054) = 21.15, 푝 < .001 휒2(7) = 188.25, 푝 < .001
Overall model: 퐹 (9, 1054) = 23.76,
푝 < .001, 푅2푎푑 푗 = .162
휒2(10) = 191.61, 푝 < .001, Pseudo-푅2 = .268
Note: Inferred values (estimates) were log-transformed as log10 (푥 +1). 푅2푎푑 푗 is adjusted 푅2. Pseudo-푅2 values
are Nagelkerke’s 푅2. For row names in upper table: d = day(s). For completeness, we have included tests of
overall model fit in these and subsequent regressions, although these were not part of our pre-registered analysis
plan.
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the stated delay – for example, by choosing a value that has
the same rank position in a contextual set of memory items;
e.g., Stewart et al., 2006). Under the associative account,
previously-encountered pairings of attributes are critical; in
the magnitude-estimation account, only the values within a
given attribute dimension are important. The two possibili-
ties could therefore be distinguished by constructing training
environments which present the same temporal and mone-
tary values in different pairs (cf Leuker et al., 2018).
A second distinction contrasts the use of purely within-
option information with the use of between-option informa-
tion. In the case of an associative strategy: people might
base their inferences on simple time-money pairings, us-
ing the stated reward to “pull out” a likely delay; or they
might draw upon the particular combinations of monetary
and temporal values that defined the pairs of options in pre-
vious choice tasks – a strategy which would permit different
inferences about the probable size of a future reward depend-
ing on the value and timing of the more immediate option.
Likewise, a participant who employs a magnitude-matching
approach might simply seek a monetary value that has the
same subjective magnitude as the stated delay; or they might
seek a monetary value such that the difference between this
reward and that of the immediate option matches the differ-
ence between the time of the delayed option and “now”. In
studies like ours, the within-option strategy would mean that
people make the same inferences about the missing values ir-
respective of the value of the immediate reward, a possibility
which could readily be tested in future. It is quite possible
that different inference/estimation strategies might be used
in different contexts.
An alternative approach would be to consider a decision-
maker’s reasoning process when confronted with these kinds
of choices. Decision-makers may expect larger delays to
be associated with larger rewards because that would be
necessary to make options with a range of delays equally
attractive on average. For example, in a financial product
marketplace, rewards would have to be greater for long-
delay products in order for them to compete with short-delay
products.5
4.2 Implications for theories and studies of
time preference
Mathematical models of delay discounting are usually inter-
preted in terms of the psychological representation of time
and money and their interaction. For example, the popular
generalized hyperbolic function (Myerson &Green, 1995) is
taken to indicate power-law scaling of money coupled with
a focus on rate of reinforcement (Doyle, 2013; Green &My-
erson, 1996). Our results suggest that choices reflect the
interplay between the monetary and time values compris-
5We are grateful to Jon Baron for this suggestion.
ing each option and the decision-makers’ expectations about
those values. In particular, people may make choices on the
basis of whether an offered option seems to be good value
relative to their expectation of the trade-off between delay
and reward.
This could lead to substantial reinterpretation of existing
functions; it could also lead to alternative models. An obvi-
ous step towards the latter would be a mathematical charac-
terization of the “inference functions” that map stated values
of time and money into expectations about missing values of
money and time. Indeed, we originally hoped that the cur-
rent studies would provide a first step in this direction; for
example, we experimented with fitting common discounting
functions to the estimates from Studies 1A and 1B plotted
in Figures 2 and 3. However, although it is possible to fit
candidate functions to our participants’ data, we ultimately
decided it would be unwise because the strong tendency of
participants to use “round numbers”means that conventional
continuous functions are inappropriate. Although the prefer-
ence for round numbers is widespread (e.g., Laming, 1997;
Matthews & Stewart, 2009), the resulting almost-discrete
distributions are not well-characterized, so modelling is a
challenge. One open question is whether the limited set of
monetary and time values produced by our participants re-
flects a response tendency or a genuine expectation that the
options will be familiar, round numbers. The latter possi-
bility might have implications for studies that employ non-
round numbers (e.g., Kirby et al., 1999).
Our results also speak to the methodologies used to study
intertemporal choice. Some studies use a single pair of op-
tions, or employ an adaptive procedure such that presented
trade-offs depend on prior choices and are thus idiosyncratic
to the participant, but many studies present a substantial
fixed set of options. One common approach is to fix one
monetary value (e.g., the delayed reward) and offer a set of
possible values for the other, and then to repeat this for a
range of delays. Two examples are shown in the top 2 panels
of Figure 5. Because the same set of rewards is used for
all delays, such studies offer steeper delay-reward trade-offs
for longer delays than for shorter ones. (Many other papers
use the same kind of approach with different specific values;
see e.g., Mahalingham et al., 2014; Shamosh et al., 2008).
The widely-used “monetary-choice questionnaire” (Kirby et
al., 1999; Towe et al., 2015) uses a more diverse mixture
of monetary and temporal values, but the options again in-
volve steeper trade-offs when delays are short (bottom panel
of Figure 5). Presumably these patterns reflect researchers’
intuitions that participants will show hyperbolic-like dis-
counting. From our perspective, people’s choices in such
tasks will (at least partly) reflect the discrepancies between
the lines plotted in Figure 5 and the curve describing partici-
pants’ expectations about the delay-reward trade-off (Figures
2 and 3). Moreover, we would expect participants to update
their expectations in light of the options they have encoun-
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tered earlier in the session – so the curves shown in Figure 5
might shape, not simply measure, participants’ discounting
functions (see Stewart et al., 2015, for similar ideas, and
Alempaki et al., 2019, Matthews, 2012, for limits on their
scope).
4.3 Implications for individual differences in
intertemporal choice
Our studies suggest that part of the reason people differ
in their preferences is because they have different expecta-
tions about the delays and rewards that they will encounter
– presumably because of different past experiences with the
delay-reward structure of their environment. Beyond offer-
ing a possible explanation for unexplained variance in choice
behaviour (Myerson et al., 2016), this suggests a new per-
spective on previously-reported associations between inter-
temporal choice preferences and a variety of demographic
and dispositional variables (e.g., Du et al., 2002; Mahal-
ingham et al., 2014; Reimers et al., 2009). In particular,
we found that older adults expected smaller future rewards
and longer delays than did younger adults. The absolute
value of the effect was not large, but to the extent that older
people typically have more pessimistic expectations about
delayed rewards than do young people, they will be more
pleasantly surprised (or less unpleasantly surprised) by any
offered “larger-later” option – and hence presumably more
likely to choose it. Several studies have indeed found that
older people are more likely to choose to wait in the kind
of monetary-choice experiment used here (e.g., Green et al.,
1994; Jimura et al., 2011; Li et al., 2013; Löckenhoff et al.,
2011; Reimers et al., 2009; Whelan &McHugh, 2009), lead-
ing to claims that “delay discounting declines across the lifes-
pan” (Odum, 2011, p. 6). However, other studies have found
the opposite effect (e.g., Albert & Duffy, 2012) a curvilinear
effect of age (e.g., Richter & Mata, 2018), or no association
(e.g., Chao et al., 2009; see Löckenhoff & Samanez-Larkin,
2020). Therefore, rather than making a strong claim about
the association between age and time-preference, we simply
raise the possibility that variables found to predict tempo-
ral discounting may do so partly via effects on expectations
about the delay-reward trade-off. (It should also be noted
that caution is necessary when interpreting age effects found
in volunteer samples such as ours. It is possible, for instance,
that people volunteer for different reasons at different ages
and some other unobserved variable is driving the observed
differences.)
4.4 Future Directions
Our results suggest several lines of future work, including. . .
1. Retaining ambiguity about the unknown values. In our
studies, participants were asked to assume that their
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Figure 5: Trade-offs between money and time in typical ex-
periments of intertemporal choice.
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estimate of the missing delay or reward was correct,
such that the choice task used their estimate to form the
delayed option. Resolving the ambiguity in this way
helps to clarify the relationship between people’s infer-
ences about the missing attributes and their indifference
points. However, outside the lab people often have to
make choices when the delay or reward remain ambigu-
ous (Dai et al., 2019), and it would be useful to explore
the links between stated values, inferred values, and
choice behaviour in that kind of situation. This would
also permit investigation of order effects: our design ne-
cessitated that estimates came before choices, but with
ambiguous options task order could be counterbalanced
to see whether (for example) the act of choosing affects
inference, and vice-versa.
2. Investigating inferences and choices in a within-subject
design. We focused on “one-shot” decisions so as to
avoid participants constructing inferences based on the
local environment of the test session (Pleskac & Her-
twig, 2014; Skylark&Prabhu-Naik, 2018) but, as noted
above, studies of time preference often try to elicit indi-
vidual discounting functions by presenting people with
a set of choices, and generalizing our approach to this
paradigm may be profitable.
3. Testing whether environmental contingencies underlie
inferences about missing attributes by manipulating
the delay-reward trade-off in a training environment
to see whether this directly modulates inferences about
missing attributes, and choices when all attributes are
present, in a subsequent test stage – as has been done
for studies of the risk-reward heuristic (Leuker et al.,
2018, 2019a,b).
4. Generalizing to other contexts. We focused on expecta-
tions about the delay-reward trade-off in psychology re-
search. Although researchers are typically interested in
“real” decisions, simplified money-time trade-off ques-
tions are used as a testbed for developing and testing the-
ories of intertemporal choice, so understanding the role
of expectations in this context is important. Nonethe-
less, it will be necessary to generalize to other scenarios
– for example, by asking people to infer the final value
of a fixed-term investment fund, or to estimate the price
of an “express delivery” service that brings forward the
point at which a product can be consumed.
5. Examining whether other individual difference vari-
ables predict inferences about missing attributes. Of
particular interest are variables such as socio-economic
status and the “Big 5” personality traits, which have
been associated with patterns of intertemporal choice
(Mahalingham et al., 2014; Oshri et al., 2019). Does
this reflect different expectations about the delay-reward
trade-off? And do differing expectations themselves re-
flect different environmental experiences, as might be
expected for demographic variables such as income?
6. Examining the consequence of violated expectations.
Our choice task focused on participants’ willingness to
wait for the delayed option that they had inferred from
the stated values. A straightforward extension would be
to present options that deviated from the participant’s
inference. The simple prediction is that participants
who inferred/expected longer delays will be more likely
to choose to wait than those who inferred short delays
– and vice-versa for inferred rewards.
7. Omitting more information. Choices often involve am-
biguity about more than one attribute value. For exam-
ple, both the shorter and longer delay may be unknown.
We can envisage studies that probe expectations about
missing values from progressively diminished informa-
tion, including, in the limit, inferences about the delay-
reward trade-off when all that is known is that there are
two options that differ in when they occur. Such studies
would establish more comprehensively the background
knowledge that participants bring to time-preference
tasks, and how they construct expectations using this
knowledge in combination with the information pro-
vided in the task.
We have collected preliminary data to explore some of
these issues (details are available from the corresponding
author), but there is much more to do in future.
5 Conclusions
These studies indicate the potential value of probing people’s
expectations about the trade-off between time and money.
Despite widespread individual variation, there were reli-
able tendencies to infer longer delays from larger rewards,
and vice-versa, with implications for theories and empirical
investigations of delay discounting. In addition, age was
somewhat associated with more pessimistic expectations,
such that these expectations may partly explain previously-
observed differences in discounting by older and younger
adults.
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Appendix: Details of Participant Sam-
pling and Eligibility Criteria
Sample sizes were somewhat arbitrary and shaped by bud-
getary considerations: we simply requested and obtained a
fixed number of participants from the recruitment platforms
(350 each for Studies 1A and 1B; 2200 in total for Studies
2A and 2B) and removed people as per the exclusion criteria
described below. For Studies 1A and 1B (run on MTurk),
we “approved” all submissions; for Studies 2A and 2B (run
on prolific.co), we rejected a handful of submissions from
participants who did not complete the task or who indicated
an age under 18, and the platform replaced these until 2200
had been approved.
In all studies, the data collection software (Qualtrics) was
set to block IP addresses that were already registered as hav-
ing completed the task (this system may be imperfect), but it
allowed participants with the same IP to re-start the survey
after exiting early. For each studywe therefore excluded rows
in the data file where the IP address had occurred earlier in
the study or in one of the previous studies in this series or
similar experiments. In the case of overlapping timestamps,
both instances were excluded. The demographics sections
at the ends of all studies asked “Which of the following best
describes you?” with response options: “This is the first time
I have completed this survey”; “I have previously started the
survey, but did not finish it (e.g., the browser crashed, I lost
progress and restarted”); “This is not the first time I have
completed this survey; I have previously completed it”). We
only included participants who chose the first option. Other
details were study-specific, as follows.
Study 1A
We requested 350 participants from MTurk. The study was
only visible to participants who had previously completed at
least 100 “HITS”, who had at least a 98% approval rating,
and who were based in the United States. The recruitment
page on MTurk told people to use a desktop computer and to
only participate if English was their first language, but these
weren’t checked/enforced. A simple consent page invited
participants to click “advance” to signal their consent. Each
participant was paid 40 cents for taking part. Data were
collected in February 2018.
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Study 1B
We requested 350 participants from MTurk, this time via
the Turkprime platform (www.cloudresearch.com), which
blocks suspicious worker IDs/locations. Participants whose
“Worker ID” had appeared in Study 1 were blocked from
participating; no requirement was put on number/proportion
of completed/approved “HITs” in the past, but participants
were requested to be from the United States. The con-
sent form included multiple yes/no questions; a “no” to
any question meant the participant was redirected to the
end of the survey. Because of concern about “bots” and
other suspicious activity on the MTurk platform around
the time this study was conducted, we ran the IP ad-
dresses and recorded Geo-location data through an online
tool (https://itaysisso.shinyapps.io/Bots/) intended to flag po-
tentially suspicious responses; we applied this on November
5th 2019. (Although we could have retrospectively applied
this screening to the participants in Study 1, we preferred to
retain the sample selected using the eligibility requirements
we planned at the time of data collection.) Each participant
was paid 40 cents for taking part. Data were collected in
December 2018.
Studies 2A and 2B
We requested 2200 participants from prolific.co, with the
requirement that participants be resident in the UK, over 18,
working on a desktop computer, that they had not previously
participated in similar studies that we had run on this plat-
form, and that they had a 95% approval rating on prolific.co.
Participants had to complete a “captcha” in order to access
the task. The survey used a consent formwith yes/no options
similar to that for Study 1B. The survey software screened
out participants from outside the UK or who were on mo-
bile devices, and those who answered “no” to any consent
questions (screened-out participants were asked to “return”
the job to Prolific). Each participant was paid 40 pence for
taking part. Data were collected in March 2020.
